We analyze the trading activity in an Internet chat room with approximately 1,300 participants. Traders make posts in real time about their activities. We find these traders are more skilled than retail investors analyzed in other studies. 55% make profits after transaction costs, and they earn $153 per trade. Traders hold their winners 25% longer than their losers. They have statistically significant α's of 0.17% per day after controlling for the Fama-French factors and momentum. 38% of profits persist in the next year. Traders improve their skill over time, earning an extra $189 per month for each year of trading experience. They also gain expertise in trading particular stocks. Traders who raise their Herfindahl index by 0.1 raise their profitability by $46 per trade. 42% trade both long and short, with equal success rates, and almost double the profit per trade when short.
Introduction
The individual investor has been carefully scrutinized in the growing literature on behavioral finance. These studies typically document the underperformance of the do-it-yourself trader. Odean [1999] and Barber and Odean [2000] trace their poor performance to excessive trading. Profits are eroded, Barber and Odean [2001] observe, by overconfidence. A tendency to sell winners quickly and hold onto losers, the disposition effect of Shefrin and Statman [1985] , also hurts profits. Other studies have attributed underperformance to poor stock selection. Goetzmann and Kumar's [2004] retail traders are underdiversified. Barber and Odean [2006] observe a tendency to buy attention grabbing stocks. Grinblatt and Keloharju [2006] find that overconfidence and sensation seeking increase trading frequency. Investors in Debondt and Thaler [1987] rely excessively on past returns which they attribute to Kahneman and Tversky's [1974] representativeness heuristic. Stock selection, Huberman [2001] , Massa and Simonov [2003] , and Amadi [2004] have noted, is subject to familiarity bias, a tendency to pick the same stocks again and again. An excellent survey of this literature is by Barberis and Thaler [2003] .
A related literature has focused on day traders. Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean [2004] study a large sample of day traders in Taiwan. They document that over 80% of day traders lose money, but that traders with strong performance continue to outperform. Daytrading firms in the U.S.
have generally been reluctant to provide information on their customers. Nonetheless, Jordan and Diltz [2003] found 36% of the 324 traders they studied in 1998 and 1999 at a national brokerage firm were profitable, with profits strongly correlated with the Nasdaq market.
The study of professional traders has been comparatively limited. Locke and Mann [2005] find that successful Chicago Mercantile Exchange floor traders quickly realize gains and losses. Garvey and Murphy [2005] study a proprietary daytrading team of 15 people over a period of three months.
These traders emulate market makers with very short term holding periods. Traders in this group average 115 trades per day and are consistently profitable.
There is also evidence that traders of all types can learn over time and improve their performance. Coval, Hirshleifer and Shumway [2005] find that the top 10% of investors earn persistent abnormal profits. Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu [2003] observe that individual investors learn about their trading skill and increase their trades and profits in subsequent periods. This paper studies a group of active traders, the majority of whom trade profitably. We rely on a unique data set compiled by the first author from a public Internet chat room. Traders voluntarily post their entries and exits from positions in real time. The room is monitored and members must register their nicknames. We find a skillful group of traders in four one-month snapshots of this trading room from 2000 to 2003.
We find that our traders resemble, in some aspects, the more unsophisticated retail investors.
They exhibit familiarity bias, concentrating their trading in a small number of high volume Nasdaq stocks. They also trade frequently. The ten most active traders average 142 trades per month.
For our skilled traders, these biases work to their advantage. The majority of them trade profitably, after transactions costs, in each month. They hold their winners 25% longer than their losers. They stick with their favorite stocks throughout the trading month, independent of past returns and volatility. Highly concentrated portfolios have the highest profitability. Raising the trader's Herfindahl index by 0.1 raises their profit per trade by $46. Contrary to the overtrading results, the traders who trade more frequently make more money, earning $153 per trade. Adjusting for the Fama-French factors and momentum, the traders have statistically significant α's of 0.17% per day.
We also find persistence in performance. Trading profits from the previous year for an individual trader strongly predict trading profits in the next year. 38% of profits persist in the next year.
Traders benefit from experience. Each year in the trading room adds $189 to their monthly trading profits.
42% of traders take short positions. Traders are equally likely to make profits trading long or short, and their profit per trade on the short side is nearly double that on the long. Traders who trade both short and long have a 10% higher chance of trading profitably.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the chat room and illustrates the kind of information that we have logged. The third section describes the results of a survey of chat room participants. We study stock selection in the fourth section. The fifth section focuses on profitability. A final section concludes.
Description of the Chat Room

Activetrader
Activetrader is a public Internet chat room accessible without any user fees. It is the largest of several discussion forums managed through the Financialchat.com network. With a simple piece of software known as a chat client, traders can view and post information about their trading activities that is visible to everyone else in the room. Traders register their nicknames. Over short time periods, we can be sure these are unique to a specific individual. The room is monitored by about a dozen operators whose nicknames appear with an @ prefix. During the four years of our analysis, the chat room averaged approximately 1, 300 traders. Only a small portion of these traders, around 13%, post their trades in the room. In total, we analyze almost 9, 000 trades.
[INSERT Table 1 Here] Public access rooms like Activetrader need to be differentiated from the numerous fee based trading rooms on the Internet. In fee based rooms, novice traders pay to have access to the expertise of skilled traders. While there are many legitimate operations of this type, there were several well publicized cases of abuse. A notorious example of this was a room run by a Korean-American Yun Soo Oh Park who operated under the name of "Tokyo Joe." Park was fined 1 by the SEC in March 2001 for front running the picks he made in the room.
Activetrader is a decentralized organization with no master stock pickers. The role of the operators in Activetrader is primarily to filter out hyping and non-market relevant posts. Repeated violations result in traders being banned from the room. Traders are also discouraged from posting information about stocks with trading prices of less than $1.00.
The room is a cooperative venture. Traders perceive themselves to be in competition with market makers and institutional traders. While often working in isolation, they participate in a "virtual trading floor" that "simulates the ebb and flow and signals of investor sentiment." This "support group" helps traders keep track of fundamental and technical information about their stock positions. 2
Logs and filters
The first author collected the posts from this chat room at sporadic intervals over a four year period 
Survey Data
We asked traders in the months of February and March 2004 to fill out a survey about their trading activities. We asked them questions about portfolio size, trading frequency, entry and exit strategies. A tabulation of the survey results is in Table 2 .
[INSERT Table 2 Here] 67 people from the Activetraders Chat Room participated in our survey. The average trader is a middle aged male, with $198,000 exposed in the market. The age and sex distribution of our survey is similar to the SEC day trading 3 study.
The survey results, as well as comments received, seem to indicate that these are confident individuals, who are suspicious of analysts and other insiders as demonstrated by their willingness to prefer "Internet Messages Boards" as an entry strategy, over "Investment Opinion Services". Barber and Odean [2001] have found that overconfident males tend to be poor traders.
Traders in the survey have a median of five years experience. Given the time period of our study, this spans the Internet bubble and the subsequent bear market. 74.64% of them trade 8 or fewer stocks a day, with a median of 4. Half of them hold their trades less than 6.5 hours (a whole trading day).
A distinctive feature of our sample is that 60.29% use both long and short positions. The more seasoned traders (more than 5 years) also engaged in option and futures trading, while a small minority trade commodities and bonds. It is interesting to note, that the more experienced traders were the ones most likely (73%) to trade in high risk issues such as options, futures and commodities. This could indicate that as the trader gets more experience, they increase risk seeking behavior in order to maximize their returns.
One of the main points of our survey was to determine how traders choose their entry point in a trade. As expected, day traders are momentum players. The survey showed that 75% pick a stock, and its entry point based on momentum measures. Technical analysis, in its many forms, is the second most preferred method. The third most popular entry strategy (59.7%) was based on "News". Although "Past Experience" was the fourth most popular method with 46.27%, our analysis of trading activity showed that day traders tended to trade the same issues repeatedly.
39% of respondents selected "Gut instinct" as a reason to enter a trade. Of those who use instinct, 95% had traded less than five years. Although it is generally assumed that traders have a herd mentality, these measures did not rate highly in our survey. "Other Trader Picks", was only the fifth most popular pick at 44.78%, with the other herding measures "Message Boards", and, "Investment Opinion Services", getting only 10.45% and 7.46% support respectively. "Stop losses" and "Target percentage" were the dominant exit strategies, used by 65.67% or traders. "Technical analysis" (46.27%) and "Past Experience" (44.78%) appear to help them choose the exit points. "Gut instinct" (37.31%) is third. Again, the less experienced traders are the most likely to cite instinct as a trading method. Our traders appear to seek short term gains rather than hedging (4.48%) long term positions.
Technical analysis is widely used for both entries and exits. The two most popular technical analyses tools "Chart Patterns" (56.72%), and "Moving Averages" (52.24%) are among the easiest to understand and utilize. The more complicated, and mathematically demanding methods, "Stochastics", "Fibonacci Analysis", and "Bollinger Bands", are more rarely used.
Stock Selection
This section examines stock selection by the chat room as a whole. We first examine the cross sectional characteristics of the stocks that traders choose. Then we try to examine whether traders focus on a relatively small number of stocks. Finally, we explain daily stock selection as a function of volume and returns.
Cross section
Let n k,t denote the number of trades in stock k on day t. Define n b k,t and n a k,t analogously for the long and short trades. N t = K n b k,t + n a k,t is the total number of trades, where K denotes the universe of securities. The totals for long and short trades are N b t = K n b k,t and N a t = K n a k,t . Denote the trading frequency in stock k,
Define p b k,t and p a k,t similarly for long and short trades. We want to understand the cross section characteristics of the stocks selected each month,
where T is the number of trading days. We examine whether traders choose stocks with large market capitalizations, high β's, and high trading volume
The market cap is based on the market value on the day before the trading month begins, the β is computed based on the previous 50 days covariance with the S&P 500, the trading volume V k is the average from the previous month. Results for (3) for each trading month and all four years are in Table 3 . We estimate the model for all trades, and long and short trades separately.
[INSERT Table 3 
Trade concentration
The chat room provides a unique laboratory for testing hypotheses about trade concentration. We observe a reasonably large group of people sharing a common information set. We first measure concentration by looking at the proportion of trades in the most active securities. We then report
Herfindahl indexes for the room and the most active individual traders.
Frequently traded stocks in the chat room
We report trade frequency results separately for NASDAQ and NYSE issues in Table 4 . Traders trade NASDAQ stocks more six time more often than NYSE stocks (1,142 versus 182). This ratio is higher in 2000 and 2001 (8.59 and 9.68) than in 2002 or 2003 (3.83 and 3.66 ). This appears to be due either to the collapse of the Internet bubble or to a declining appetite for risk. In the previous section, we found that β did not enter the stock selection cross section after 2001.
[INSERT Table 4 Here]
Trade concentration in NYSE stocks is much higher than in NASDAQ issues. The 5-stock concentration ratio averages 63.58% for the NYSE stocks and only 18.22% for NASDAQ. The 25-stock concentration ratio is over 90% for the NYSE and 47% for NASDAQ.
The pattern of long trades is similar to the pattern of overall trades. For NASDAQ issues, the 5-stock concentration ratios never differ by more than 2% from the overall figure. The 25-stock concentration is always within 4%. The NYSE concentration ratios are within 5% of the all trade averages at 5 and 25-stock levels, except for 2001.
Short trades are substantially more concentrated than longs. The average 5-stock NASDAQ concentration ratio is nearly 30%, more than 12% higher than for longs. At 25-stocks, the average concentration ratio is 71.22% versus 44.91% for the longs. The NYSE differences are similar. The average 5-stock concentration ratio is almost 77% versus 60.83% for longs. The gap at 25 stocks is smaller, 8.85%, only because the ratio is 100% for the shorts.
The most frequent stocks selected in 2000 and 2001 are in Table 5 Table 5 Here]
While the individual securities traded show considerable variation between sample months, trading activity does remain confined in a small number of issues. We measure this formally using the Herfindahl index
We define a similar index H b t for long and H a t for short trades. If trades were distributed uniformly, the Herfindahl index would equal 1/K. If all trading was in a single stock, then the Herfindahl would equal 1.0. We will take as the null hypothesis that trading activity in the room is proportional to trading volume V k,t in the market as a whole,
where
We compare the two Herfindahl indexes in Table 6 [INSERT Table 6 Here]
using an F -test for the variance ratio,
In Table 6 , we find that none of the Herfindahl numbers exceed the market's measure. The room as a whole is significantly less concentrated than the market.
Herfindahl indexes for traders
The fact that the room is not concentrated does not imply that individual traders do not focus on specific issues. Define the trading frequency of trader j in the k th security on day t,
where n j,k,t is the number of trades and N j,t = K n b j,k,t + n a j,k,t . Define a Herfindahl index for trader j
We compare this to the market weights again using the variance ratio
For 2000, in the last column of Barber and Odean [2003] have examined the question of stock selection among individual investors.
Daily trading frequency
They find in a large sample of retail traders and investors that traders tend to buy attention grabbing stocks. They measure this in three ways: abnormal trading volume, previous day's returns, and the square of the previous day's returns. Using daily data from CRSP, we measured abnormal volume AV k,t−1 as the percentage difference from the 50-day moving average. The return series is constructed from daily closing prices. A positive effect from past returns is a prediction of the representativeness heuristic. The squared return is a proxy 4 for volatility.
This regression adds the lagged trading frequency modeled by Barber, Odean, and Zhu [2006] .
We estimate this equation, pooled and by month, for all trades, buys and short sells separately.
Results are in Table 7 .
[INSERT Table 7 Here]
For the sample as a whole, for all trades, two regressors are significant, the lagged trading frequency and the abnormal volume. It is the lagged frequency, however, that predominates. It has a much stronger t−ratio, and it enters significantly in all the sub-samples. Abnormal volume only enters significantly in the grouped four year sample for all trades. A ten million share increase in abnormal volume would raise the overall trading frequency by only 0.03%. The four variables explain about 11.5% of the trade frequency. In the 2002 sub-sample, the R 2 is the highest at 22.4%.
Long and short trades are driven by the previous day's trading frequency. For long trades, the lagged trading frequency is significant in each sub-sample. Abnormal volume is significant in the overall sample, and lagged returns matter in 2000 and 2002. Short trade frequencies have less persistence than long ones. b 1 is significant on the short trades only in 2003, and in the grouped four year sample. The model also fits the long trades slightly better than the short ones.
Our interpretation of the lagged frequency variable is different than Barber, Odean and Zhu [2006] . Traders do have a familiarity bias, but we attribute this to stock specific trading skills. We find below, in our examination of profits, that traders who stick with a few familiar stocks make more money.
Short selling
Traders in the Activetrader chat room short more often that do normal retail traders. Angel, Christophe and Ferri [2003] found that only 1 in 42 trades on Nasdaq is a short sale. In Barber and Odean [2003] only 0.29 percent of the more than 66,000 traders in the room take short positions.
In Table 1 , we see that our activetraders short very often, more than 27% of the time over the four months. In the peak month, April 2001, 33.88% of the trades are shorts. 41.58% of traders make at least one short sale in the four year sample. In the next section, we see that they trade profitably on the short and long side.
Holding period
Activetrader is primarily populated by daytraders. Table 1 shows that they have very short holding times on average. The average trade duration is 55.11 minutes for trades where we see both entries and exits. We call these trades round trips. These represent only about 30% of trades. For the trades we close out, the average duration is 186.77 minutes.
We now assess the effects of these trading decisions on profits and returns.
Profit and Return Analysis
There are three major concerns which must be addressed in computing the profitability of trading in the chat room. First, we do not observe position sizes. These are rarely reported, and are probably unreliable. We will make two assumptions: (A) 1,000 share lot size; (B) $25,000 per trade; Second, we also do not observe actual trading prices. Fortunately, these can be matched against quote data. We compare the price posted by the trader to the high and low bid price during the minute the trade is posted. If the price posted falls in this range, we use the traders posted price. If it does not, we use the opening bid price for that minute. We find that 5.32% of trade reports use unreliable prices that deviate more than 1% from the one minute quote range.
The third issue is reporting bias. Traders more often report their profits on good trades. Round trips are profitable 67.35% of the time. The trades we open or close at the beginning or end of the day are profitable only 50.48% of the time. If the null hypothesis is that stock prices follow a random walk, applying an arbitrary exit time to trades should have no effect on profitability.
Inaccurate entry times could present a problem if traders falsely report closing trades in stocks with big price changes. This does not appear to be the case with our data though. The trades with no entry post have a 2.74% lower profit per trade than the rest of the sample.
Profits
To compute dollar profit and losses for each trader, we make transaction cost assumptions 5 for position size assumptions A and B. For position A, we assume a $20 commission. This is a $0.02 per share commission on the 1,000 share round trip. Numerous brokers offer commissions in this range. For position size B, we assume a $0.005 per share commission and a 50 basis point slippage.
These reflect the lower commissions typically paid on larger lot sizes, and some market impact on the larger trades. We find that none of the position or transaction costs assumptions has a qualitative impact on our profit estimates.
We examine profits for all trades for the four months in Table 8 . The first profit measure is the aggregate difference between selling and buying prices so the reader can gauge the effect of the transactions costs. The second measure A uses the low cost estimate with flat commissions. The second measure B has higher transactions costs, but sometimes benefits from the larger lot sizes.
[INSERT Table 8 found in other studies of retail investors or daytraders. This is why we feel comfortable regarding these semi-professional and professional traders as experts.
We can directly address the effects of trading on profits with our imputed transaction data base. We regress the profits of each trader under assumption A on the number of trades they make during the month. We find a strong positive incremental profit of $152.66 per trade in the pooled sample. In the month of June-July 2003, with a smaller number of surviving traders as the bear market ends, each trade earns an incremental profit of $245.67.
While Anderson, Henker and Owen [2005] find that trading frequency improves relative performance, their sample from an Australian discount broker underperforms the market. The experts in our chat room are "Activetraders" for a good reason; trading, for them, is a profitable activity.
Our traders make money trading both long and short. When we break apart profits short versus long, we find that 74.7% of profits are made trading long and 25.3% short. Trades are equally likely to be profitable long versus short, 53.97% long compared to 56.07% short. The marginal profit per trade is substantially higher on the short side than the long, $210.84 per trade short versus $110.87
long in the pooled sample. Short traders are also more skillful overall. Over the four years, 51.55%
of traders who never short are profitable under assumption A, compared with 62.21% for traders who trade both short and long.
For the remainder of this section, we will utilize the more conservative profit assumptions A.
Effect of holding period on profits
To calculate the disposition effect, we calculate the length of the holding period for winners and losers in the entire chat room's portfolio. We only used the round-trip trades where we have entry and exit time stamps.
We find that our traders realize their losses quickly and hold their winners longer. The average holding period for losing trades was 47.87 minutes. Winners were held on average 25% longer or 60.23 minutes. These results contrast several others in the literature: Jordan and Diltz [2004] , where 62% of traders held their losers longer; Lehenkari and Perttunen [2004] , who found a onesided effect of losses on the propensity to sell; and Garvey and Murphy [2004] where the disposition effect lowered the returns of profitable professionals. Shefrin and Statman [1985] pointed out that professional traders employ pre-commitment mech-anisms, such as stop losses and target percentages, to control their resistance to realizing losses.
Our survey data and trade postings from Activetrader corroborate the use of these techniques. Dhar and Zhu [2006] found that wealthier and well-educated traders could mitigate the disposition effect. Our skilled traders appear to reverse it.
Adjusted returns
Our return analysis examines the risk return tradeoff of a representative trader with the survey average $198, 000 portfolio. We assume that the funds the trader does not use in the chat room earn the risk free rate of return.
We measure excess returns as daily portfolio returns R p,t less the risk free rate, R f . We use the We also adjust the returns for the three Fama and French [1993] factors and a factor for momentum. The first factor is the value weighted return on all NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX stocks less the risk free rate. This is the standard CAPM factor. The second factor SMB adjusts for market capitalization. It places 1/3 weights on the difference between three small portfolios and three big portfolios consisting of value, neutral and growth stocks. The third factor HML adjusts for value versus growth. It is the average difference of two value and two growth portfolios.
The data for the first three factors are from the daily return series on Ken French's website. 6 We constructed the fourth factor using the methodology in Carhart [1997] and Barber, Odean and Zhu [2003] . It consists of a portfolio of stocks with the highest and lowest 30% of returns in the preceding trading month. The momentum factor is the daily return difference between an equal weighted portfolio of the high and low return stocks.
[INSERT Table 9 Here]
These four factors explain, except for 2001, between 15 and 68% of excess returns of the chat room traders in Table 9 . The CAPM and momentum factors are never statistically significant. α is Table 10 (a).
[INSERT Table 10 Here]
Are surviving traders likely to be successful in the next trading period? Let π j,T denote trading profits for trader j in the current trading month. Then regress current month profits on the profits from last year,
The results This elite group of surviving traders, just 20.1% of the entire group of traders, earn 49.6% of the profits.
We next see if experience contributes to profits. Let A j,T be the number of years that the trader has posted trades into Activetrader including the current year. We estimate the model
Results are in Table 10 (c). We find a weak but positive relationship between profits and experience. An alternative measure of experience is stock specific. Perhaps traders benefit from trading a particular stock more frequently. If there is stock specific knowledge, we should find that more trades should raise the profitability of the trader π j,T /n j,T . We measure trade concentration as we did previously using the Herfindahl index,
Results for this regression for profitable traders who make at least three trades 7 during the month are in Table 10 This last finding provides a fresh perspective on the familiarity bias literature. Traders appear to develop expertise trading specific stocks that enhances their profitability.
Conclusion
Our group of skilled traders has ignored many of the lessons from their finance classes. They trade very frequently; they focus on the same stocks regardless of market conditions. They make no attempt to diversify. In spite of all these errors, nearly 55% earn profits after transactions costs.
Trading earns them money, and not surprisingly, they trade often.
They are more sophisticated than simple momentum investors. The momentum factor accounts for little of their daily returns. Together with the other Fama-French factors, we estimate a statistically significant α of 0.17% per day. Further evidence of their skill can be seen in their ability to earn profits both long and short.
Their knowledge also appears to grow and adapt to market conditions. Traders realize losses quickly and hold their winners 25% longer. Traders maintain 38% of their profits from one-year to the next. Each year of experience adds to their profits. Concentrating on a small group of stocks 7 If we include the losing traders, the results remain positive but are not statistically significant.
enhances their profitability.
Market surveys indicate the influence of these active traders. 25% of daily volume on the NYSE and Nasdaq comes from semi-professional traders. 8 We hope that this paper has helped to shed some light on this small but important group. (3) for the four chat room sub-samples. t-ratios are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the probability of selecting stock k during that month. The independent variables are the stock market capitalization and average trading volume of the prior month, and β. β is measured as the prior 50-day covariance with the S&P 500 index. Notes: The table reports estimates of trader profits under three assumptions. 1 share profit is the aggregate difference between entry and exit prices. Assumption A is a 1, 000 share lot size with a $20 commission. B assumes a $25,000 position, with a $0.005 per share commission, and 0.5% slippage. The table provides estimates of the influence of market factors on the chat room's daily returns. The first factor is the market return less the 1-month Treasury bill rate. The second factor SMB adjusts for market capitalization. The third factor HML adjusts for value versus growth. These three factors were obtained from Ken French's website. The momentum factor is constructed by the authors using the Carhart (1997) methodology. 
